UPDATED OVERVIEW 

1. Overview

Schedule 5 – Condition 1 of the draft licence requires a complete redesign and reinstallation of the first-floor shower room and even proposes removal of an existing amenity if certain arbitrary spacing measurements are not met.
This condition is unlawful, irrational, disproportionate, procedurally defective, and entirely inconsistent with the Housing Act 2004, national standards, and established public-law principles.

It is crucial to emphasise that this bathroom:

• has been used in the exact same configuration for more than 20 years, without incident;

• has been repeatedly inspected and approved by Building Control and by the Council’s HMO officers in 2018, 2019, and 2020, all without objection;

• was expressly included in the 2020 HMO licence;

• has been safely and satisfactorily used by hundreds of tenants over decades;

• and matches bathroom layouts widely used and licensed in HMOs throughout England, including multiple other licensed properties under the Applicant’s management.

Across all those years, authorities, and licences, no enforcement action has ever been taken, no redesign has ever been requested, and no such condition has ever been imposed—because the layout is standard, safe, accepted, and compliant.

Nothing in the property has changed.
Nothing in the law has changed.
Nothing in national amenity standards has changed.
The only change is the identity of the officer, whose personal, subjective opinion now drives a requirement unsupported by legislation.

Under Coughlan, Hanif, Mohamed, and basic fairness principles, a public authority cannot reverse a previously accepted configuration under unchanged law simply because a different employee holds a different subjective view.
Subjective judgement is not a legal standard.
A licensing condition cannot invent new statutory requirements.

If this condition is not struck out, it would create a deeply dangerous precedent:

1. An unchanged property under unchanged law could be declared “non-compliant” solely due to an individual officer’s personal preferences.

2. The property’s sanitary provision would be reduced, despite exceeding statutory requirements for a 7-bed HMO (which needs only two bathrooms).

3. Longstanding, functional amenities could be lost, harming tenant welfare for no lawful purpose.

4. Councils would effectively gain the ability to make law by opinion, in place of statutory standards.

 

Contradictions and Irrationalities in Schedule 5, Condition 1

A further and fundamental difficulty with Schedule 5, Condition 1 is that it is internally contradictory and therefore incapable of sensible or lawful application. First, the condition simultaneously requires the licence holder to “redesign and reinstall” the first-floor bathroom while also insisting that, if the macerator toilet is retained, it must be “kept clear of blockages at all times”. This is illogical: the Council states elsewhere that it is “preferable” for one amenity to be removed—meaning the toilet may be removed altogether—yet in the same condition it imposes an ongoing operational obligation to maintain the very appliance it is inviting the landlord to remove. A legal requirement that applies only if an amenity exists is incompatible with a requirement that the amenity should preferably not exist at all. No enforcement officer can rationally enforce both simultaneously.

Secondly, the Council proposes that lack of compliance with subjective spatial preferences could justify removal of amenities—an outcome which would reduce bathroom provision, even though the amenity schedule in the licence already depends on this bathroom being part of the total of three shared bathrooms with toilets. Thus, the Council’s own licensing framework requires the toilet and shower to exist for the property to continue meeting its declared provision. A condition allowing removal of one of these amenities directly contradicts Schedule 2 and undermines compliance with the Council’s own assessment of required facilities.

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Thirdly – The Dimensional Requirements Are Non-Statutory Recommendations, Not Law, and the Officer’s Attempt to “Create” Enforceability by Inserting Them into the Licence Is Unlawful

Thirdly, Schedule 5, Condition 1 imposes rigid dimensional requirements for the WC, wash hand basin and shower (e.g. 800 mm × 600 mm for the WC, 1100 mm × 700 mm for the basin, 700 mm clearance in front of the shower, etc.). These specifications do not appear anywhere in legislation. They are not found in:

• the Housing Act 2004;

• the Licensing and Management of Houses in Multiple Occupation Regulations 2006;

• the HMO Management Regulations 2006;

• any Statutory Instrument;

• any national HMO amenity standards; or

• any Building Regulation relating to sanitary accommodation.

The only place these numbers appear is in the Council’s own internal HMO guidance, where they are expressly labelled as “recommended” dimensions:

“The following floor areas are recommended…”

A recommendation:

• is not law,

• is not binding,

• does not create a statutory duty, and

• cannot be relied upon to impose structural works or compel removal of amenities.

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The Council Itself Has Always Treated These Recommendations as Non-Binding

This is demonstrated by the Council’s own historical behaviour:

• 2018 inspection: no issue raised.

• 2019 inspection: no issue raised.

• 2020 inspection & licence: no issue raised, bathroom expressly accepted.

• Multiple identical bathrooms in other licensed HMOs: never an issue.

Officers previously understood these numbers were not enforceable. They were not applied, not relied upon, and not inserted into any licence because they have no statutory force.

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The Officer Is Now Attempting to Bypass Non-Enforceability by Inserting Recommendations into the Licence

This is the crucial point.

The officer appears to recognise that:

• these dimensional standards are not law,

• they are not enforceable under the Housing Act,

• they cannot justify enforcement action, and

• they cannot compel the landlord to redesign or remove amenities.

To circumvent this, she has attempted to insert the recommended dimensions into the licence condition itself, in an apparent belief that once written into a licence, these previously unenforceable recommendations suddenly become binding.

This is legally incorrect.

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A Licensing Condition Cannot Transform a Non-Statutory Recommendation into a Legal Obligation

The Tribunal has consistently held that:

• Licence conditions cannot be used to create new obligations not found in legislation;

• A council cannot use licence wording to expand its statutory powers (Hanif, Mohamed);

• A condition based on non-statutory guidance is ultra vires if it purports to impose legal duties not set by Parliament;

• A condition is unlawful if it relies on a local preference rather than statutory necessity;

• A landlord cannot commit an offence for failing to comply with a condition that is itself beyond the authority’s powers (Boddington v BTP).

Therefore:

• A recommendation does not become law simply because an officer copies it into a licence.

• An unenforceable standard remains unenforceable even if written into a condition.

• The Housing Act 2004 limits conditions to those necessary to make the property suitable — this bathroom already exceeds the requirements.

• The Council cannot “bootstrap” legal authority by inserting its own guidance into a licence.

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The Officer’s Manoeuvre Exposes the Unlawfulness of the Condition

The very fact that the officer attempts to rely on a licence condition shows:

• she knows the requirement has no legislative basis,

• she knows it cannot be enforced directly,

• she is attempting to achieve indirectly what cannot lawfully be required directly, and

• she is effectively treating the licence as a tool to enforce her personal opinion, not statutory duties.

This is precisely the type of administrative overreach the Tribunal exists to prevent.

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Therefore

• The dimensional standards are not law,

• They are non-binding recommendations,

• They have been ignored by the Council for years,

• No other licence contains them, and

• Inserting them into a licence does not make them enforceable.

This attempt to give statutory force to an unenforceable recommendation is ultra vires, irrational, procedurally improper, and must be struck out.

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Fourthly

This internal inconsistency produces a perverse outcome: the landlord may spend money redesigning the bathroom to meet the officer’s non-statutory preferences, only to be later told that the result is still non-compliant, and that removal of amenities — possibly the toilet itself — is required. But if the toilet is removed, the Council will then rely on other parts of the licence to enforce the requirement that the macerator and WC be kept operational. The landlord is therefore at the mercy of two mutually exclusive directives:
(1) remove the toilet, and
(2) ensure the toilet (and macerator) are fully operational at all times.

This contradiction alone renders the condition irrational in the Wednesbury sense.

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Finally

Because the property already contains three fully functioning bathrooms, the enforcement of any redesign requirement is further irrational: even if the first-floor facility were completely unused, the house would continue to exceed statutory HMO amenity minimums. The condition therefore cannot be justified on suitability grounds under s.64 of the Housing Act 2004. A condition that seeks to reduce amenities in a house that already meets and exceeds statutory standards is, by definition, disproportionate, unnecessary and incapable of lawful enforcement.

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Conclusion

Together, these contradictions show that Schedule 5, Condition 1 is not merely unlawful — it is logically incoherent, impossible to comply with, and internally self-defeating.
It must therefore be struck off in its entirety.

 

CRITICAL ADDITION – Legal Uncertainty and Arbitrary Discretion

If Condition 1 is allowed to remain, the Applicant’s entire property investment becomes vulnerable to ongoing, unpredictable, subjective reinterpretation.

Because the condition is based on personal opinion — not measurable statutory standards — no matter what the landlord does, the officer can deem the works “not acceptable.”
This creates:

• no objective benchmark for compliance,

• no legal certainty,

• no guaranteed path to satisfy the requirement,

• and a continuous risk that the officer may demand further changes or even removal of amenities.

In other words, the landlord becomes subject not to the law, but to the personal discretion of an individual officer.

This is precisely the kind of arbitrary decision-making that public-law principles prohibit under Wednesbury, Coughlan, and Lambeth LBC v Secretary of State.

Condition 1 is also unenforceable as a matter of law

A 7-person HMO requires two bathrooms.
This property has three.
Even if the first-floor bathroom did not exist, the property would still comply fully with statutory amenity minima.

Therefore, a redesign or removal requirement cannot be justified as “necessary to ensure suitability for occupation” under s.64(3)(a) of the Housing Act 2004.
It is redundant, unnecessary, irrational, and unenforceable.

For all these reasons, Schedule 5 – Condition 1 is:

• unsupported by legislation or national guidance,

• contradicted by 20+ years of safe lawful use,

• contradicted by multiple approved inspections,

• contradicted by the Council’s own historical licensing decisions,

• based solely on subjective opinion,

• incapable of lawful enforcement,

• procedurally unfair and irrational,

• and dangerous because it substitutes individual discretion for objective statutory law.

The Tribunal is therefore respectfully invited to strike out Schedule 5 – Condition 1 in full.

 

Statutory Amenity Standards – Seven Occupants Require Only Two Bathrooms

– CONDITION IS LEGALLY UNENFORCEABLE 

Even if the Council were to attach this redesign requirement to the licence, any attempt to enforce it would collapse immediately.
The property already exceeds statutory amenity standards; the bathroom is long-established, lawful, compliant with Building Regulations, and previously approved; and non-compliance with the redesign condition would not constitute an offence under the Housing Act 2004.

In short: this condition is unenforceable in law.

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1. Statutory Amenity Standards – Minimum Requirement for Seven Occupants

Under:

• LACORS Housing Standards (2010)

• HMO Management Regulations 2006 (as amended)

• Mandatory Conditions for HMOs (England) Regulations 2018

the statutory minimum is clear:

For 6–10 persons → TWO bathrooms/shower rooms required.

There is no legal requirement anywhere in England for three bathrooms in a seven-person HMO.

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2. The Property Has Three Bathrooms — Exceeding the Statutory Minimum by 50%

63 Canwick Road contains:

• Three fully functioning bathrooms,

• Each with WC, basin, and shower,

• All lawful, long-established, and previously approved.

Even if the first-floor bathroom did not exist, the property would:

Still exceed statutory requirements.

Therefore, the proposed redesign condition serves no statutory purpose and cannot be enforced.

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3. Housing Act 2004 – No Offence Can Arise Because the Property Is Already Fully Compliant

Under ss. 64, 67 and 72 Housing Act 2004, enforcement is only available where:

• the HMO fails prescribed national standards, or

• a licence condition is necessary to ensure suitability.

Because:

• the property already exceeds the required bathroom provision,

• and remains fully compliant regardless of any redesign,

non-compliance with this redesign condition cannot create any offence under the Housing Act.

A condition cannot create criminal liability where the underlying statutory requirement is already met.

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4. Ultra Vires – The Condition Exceeds the Council’s Legal Powers

Under ss. 64(3)(a) and 67(1)(b) Housing Act 2004, licence conditions must be:

• necessary, or

• appropriate

to ensure suitability.

Here, the HMO is already suitable without the redesign.
Therefore, the condition is:

• not necessary,

• not appropriate,

• not authorised by statute, and

• ultra vires.

This falls squarely within R (Peat) v South Hams DC [2008] EWHC 1076 (Admin), where the High Court held that councils cannot impose conditions requiring structural alterations when no statutory need exists.

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5. Wednesbury Unreasonableness – The Condition Is Irrational

Under Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223, a decision is unlawful if it:

• is irrational,

• relies on irrelevant considerations, or

• ignores relevant statutory factors.

Requiring redesign of a fully functioning bathroom when:

• the HMO already exceeds statutory amenity minimums,

• the bathroom has operated safely for decades,

• and the redesign would have no effect on compliance,

is legally irrational and would be struck down by the Tribunal.

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6. Legitimate Expectation: No Change in Law, No Change in Standards, Only a Change in Staff (Which Cannot Override Law)

A further decisive legal objection arises from the doctrine of legitimate expectation, as articulated in R v North & East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213. Under that principle, a public authority may not reverse an established position where:

1. The law has not changed,

2. The factual circumstances have not changed,

3. The authority has previously approved the arrangement, and

4. There is no new statutory authority justifying reversal.

All four principles apply squarely here.

1. There Has Been No Change in Law or Standards – Only a Change in Personnel

Between the grant of the 2020 licence and the current draft licence, no legislation has changed:

• No new statutory minimum bathroom standards,

• No new HMO amenity regulations,

• No new HHSRS guidance,

• No new Building Regulations applicable to this bathroom,

• No new national HMO spacing or clearance standards whatsoever.

Nothing in law, regulation, or national guidance has changed from 2020 to today.

The only thing that has changed is Council staffing — a different officer with a different subjective view.
But under public law:

A change in personnel cannot create new obligations, new standards, or new legal interpretations where Parliament has created none.

Subjective preference is not law.
Staff turnover does not amend primary or secondary legislation.
Personal opinion cannot override prior lawful approvals.

2. The Bathroom Was Historically Accepted Under the Same Law Now in Force

The first-floor bathroom was:

• Inspected and approved by Building Control in 2018;

• Inspected and repeatedly accepted by HMO officers between 2018–2020;

• Formally incorporated into the 2020 HMO licence without objection;

• Used safely and satisfactorily by hundreds of tenants, including the current occupiers.

The statutory framework under which those inspections occurred is identical to the framework in force today.

Therefore, the Council’s new position represents not a legal change, but a contradiction of its own previous decisions under identical law.

That is the essence of unlawful procedural unfairness under Coughlan.

3. A Public Authority Cannot Reverse an Approved Arrangement Under Unchanged Law 

In fact, all evidence is to the contrary: the bathroom continues to function lawfully and satisfactorily as it had been over several yeas in the current configuration.

Without a change in law,  the Council’s reversal is arbitrary, procedurally unfair, and unlawful.

4. Opinion Is Not Law – And the New Opinion Conflicts with Prior Approvals and Factual Reality

The Council’s new stance is entirely based on one new officer’s subjective view, not on legislation.

• Opinions do not constitute standards.

• Preferences do not create legal duties.

• A new officer cannot “reinterpret” compliance into non-compliance without statutory backing.

Moreover, the subjective opinion is directly contradicted by:

• Prior HMO officer approvals,

• 20 plus years of use without issue,

• Hundreds of tenants who have found the bathroom fully usable,

• The current tenants’ experience.

When an opinion contradicts:
(a) the law,
(b) national standards,
(c) historical approvals,
(d) factual usage, and
(e) statutory purpose,

it cannot form the basis of a licensing condition.

5. Conclusion: The Bathroom Condition Violates Coughlan and Must Be Struck Out

Given that:

• The law has not changed,

• National standards have not changed,

• The bathroom was previously licensed in exactly the same configuration,

• The Council’s reversal is based solely on subjective opinion,

• The condition contradicts 20 plusyears of previous licensing practice,

the Council’s attempt to impose a new requirement is in breach of legitimate expectation, procedurally unfair, irrational, and ultra vires.

The Tribunal is therefore asked to:

Strike out the bathroom condition in full, as it constitutes an unlawful attempt to impose new obligations where the law has not changed.

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7. Building Regulations – The Bathroom Fully Complies

This point is now stated explicitly.

The first-floor bathroom complies with the Building Regulations 2010.

After reviewing building regulations, there is no aspect of the bathroom that breaches any part of the Building Regulations.

• No structural defect

• No ventilation issue

• No plumbing issue

• No space-standard breach (because Building Regulations do not prescribe minimum bathroom dimensions)

• No fire-safety impact

This means: the bathroom is lawful both as originally constructed and as currently configured.

Therefore, Building Regulations cannot be used to justify any redesign.

And under:

• s. 35 Building Act 1984, and

• Lambeth LBC v Secretary of State [1981] 1 WLR 1529,

Building Regulations cannot be used retrospectively to compel alterations to longstanding lawful installations (already in well established use after lawful enforcement period has elapsed). However as seen able it is compliant anyway.

Thus, even the Building Regulations angle — often misused by councils — is completely unavailable to the Council in this case.

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8. A1P1 ECHR – Disproportionate Interference With Property Rights

Under Article 1, Protocol 1 ECHR, incorporated via the Human Rights Act 1998, a public authority must not impose requirements that:

• lack legitimate public purpose,

• impose unnecessary cost, or

• degrade the utility of a property.

Here, the condition:

• reduces amenities,

• serves no public benefit,

• and imposes unnecessary cost.

It therefore constitutes a disproportionate interference and is unlawful.

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9. Conclusion – Legally Unenforceable, Irrational,

Because:

• the statutory requirement is two bathrooms,

• the property has three,

• the bathroom complies with Building Regulations,

• the bathroom was previously approved,

• no statutory deficiency exists,

• enforcement powers under the Housing Act do not arise,

• the condition is ultra vires, irrational, and disproportionate, and

• retrospective enforcement under Building Regulations is forbidden,

non-compliance with this condition would NOT create an offence, would NOT trigger enforcement power.

The condition is therefore:

• legally unenforceable,

• unsustainable,

• irrational,

• contrary to statute,

• contrary to case law,

• contrary to Building Regulations,

• and incapable of lawful enforcement.

Section – The Council’s Bathroom Assessment Is Purely Subjective Opinion, Not Law, and Cannot Justify a Licensing Condition

It must be emphasised that the Council’s position regarding the first-floor bathroom is based not on any statutory requirement, not on any prescribed national standard, not on any Building Regulation requirement, and not on any recognised HMO amenity guidance, but solely on the subjective personal opinion of an individual officer. Such subjective judgments have no legal force and cannot form the basis of a licensing condition under ss.64–67 Housing Act 2004. Licensing conditions must be grounded in law, not opinion; in objective standards, not personal preference. The Tribunal has repeatedly held (see, for example, Hanif and Mohamed) that councils may not impose conditions based on discretionary “views” that exceed, contradict, or rewrite statutory standards.

In this case, the officer’s opinion about amenity spacing in the first-floor bathroom is directly contradicted by the Council’s own previous approvals. The same bathroom layout has been licensed repeatedly over many years without objection. The property has passed numerous inspections, and no enforcement or modification has ever been required. This inconsistency illustrates that the current objection is not a matter of safety or regulatory compliance — it is simply a new opinion, applied retroactively, without any legal authority.

Furthermore, the bathroom has been used successfully, safely, and satisfactorily by hundreds of tenants over the years. This includes the current tenants, none of whom have reported the bathroom as unfit, unsafe, or impractical. The lived experience of real occupants, across a long timeframe, strongly rebuts the idea that the bathroom presents any functional or safety issue: it clearly does not.

Where a licensing condition is based solely on an officer’s subjective view — one that is unsupported by legislation, contradicted by past licensing history, rebutted by tenant experience, and in conflict with national amenity standards — the Tribunal cannot lawfully uphold it. Subjective opinions do not constitute law, and they cannot displace the statutory minimum standards set by Parliament. For these reasons, the bathroom requirement is irrational, ultra vires, and must be struck out.

Section – The Council Is Attempting to Achieve Through Licensing Conditions What It Cannot Lawfully Enforce in Any Other Way

It is also relevant that the officer responsible for inserting these new clauses has previously raised the same objections regarding both the lock and the bathroom, yet has never been able to enforce them through any lawful statutory route. The reason is straightforward: there is no legal basis on which these demands can be enforced. They do not arise from any breach of legislation, any failure to meet prescribed standards, or any contravention of national guidance. The officer’s inability to take enforcement action under the Housing Act 2004 or the HMO Management Regulations confirms that these requirements are not grounded in law, but in personal interpretation.

It now appears that, recognising the absence of enforceable statutory authority, the officer has attempted to circumvent this limitation by inserting these requirements into the conditions of the licence—using licensing conditions as a backdoor mechanism to impose obligations which the law itself does not require. However, as the Tribunal has repeatedly held, a licensing condition cannot create enforcement powers where none exist, nor can it convert a non-offence into an enforceable obligation (Hanif; Mohamed; FTT London 2019).

A condition that would be unenforceable even if breached—because no statutory duty exists in the first place—is inherently defective and must be struck out. Licensing cannot be used to fabricate legal duties, expand council powers, or impose subjective preferences that fall outside statutory authority. Even if such a condition were left in the licence and hypothetically not complied with, there would still be no lawful basis for prosecution, improvement notices, civil penalties, or any form of enforcement, because the underlying requirement itself is not supported by legislation.

For these reasons, where a condition is:

• unlawful,

• unsupported by statute,

• previously unenforceable, and

• an attempt to indirectly impose what cannot be directly required,

it must be removed. A licensing condition that is unenforceable by its very nature cannot stand and should be struck out in its entirety.

Section – Identical Bathroom Configurations in Multiple HMOs Have Been Consistently Accepted Across Councils for Many Years

It is also crucial for the Tribunal to note that the exact same bathroom configuration found in this property is present in several of the Applicant’s other HMOs, all of which are fully licensed, routinely inspected, and operated under multiple different local authorities. These include properties that have undergone repeated HMO inspections over many years without a single objection, comment, or enforcement action relating to this bathroom layout. The configuration is, in fact, a standard and commonly accepted arrangement in shared accommodation across the sector.

In every one of those HMOs:

• The bathroom is identical in size, layout, and spacing;

• The use pattern of tenants is the same;

• No hazard has ever been identified;

• No officer has ever suggested non-compliance;

• No redesign has ever been requested;

• The property has always passed inspections without issue.

The only property where this configuration has suddenly been deemed a “problem” is this one—and only because of the personal opinion of a single newly assigned officer. This sharp inconsistency across identical properties, under identical law, and under identical national standards, demonstrates that the Council’s new position is not a legally recognised standard, but merely a subjective, isolated, idiosyncratic view that no other authority or officer has shared.

A standard that is:

• not found in legislation,

• not required by national guidance,

• not applied by other councils,

• not applied by Lincoln City Council in past licences,

• not applied even within this officer’s own department historically,

cannot form the basis of an enforceable licensing condition.

At most, such a view could be expressed as an informal recommendation, but even as a recommendation it holds little weight, given that it has been completely disregarded by every other relevant authority over many years and across multiple properties.

Licensing cannot be used as a mechanism to give legal force to what is, in reality, a personal preference or non-binding suggestion. The Housing Act 2004 does not empower councils to elevate individual opinions into statutory obligations. A licensing condition must be tied to law, not to a lone officer’s subjective interpretation. Where a condition reflects nothing more than an individual view—especially one contradicted by the Council’s own historical practice and wider industry standards—it is ultra vires, irrational, inconsistent, and incapable of enforcement.

For all these reasons, the Tribunal is respectfully invited to recognise that the objection to the first-floor bathroom configuration is not only unfounded, but completely isolated, inconsistent, and unsupported by any accepted standard, and therefore cannot justify the imposition of any licensing condition whatsoever.

Closing Submission to the Tribunal – Request to Strike Out the Bathroom Condition in Full

In light of all the statutory, factual and evidential matters set out in detail above, the Applicant respectfully submits that the proposed condition relating to the first-floor bathroom must be struck out in its entirety.

The Tribunal is invited to note that:

1. Nothing whatsoever has changed in the law, in national standards, or in the configuration of the property since the 2020 licence was granted.

2. The only change between 2020 and today is the identity of individual Council employees. A change in personnel cannot create new legal obligations where Parliament has created none.

3. The first-floor bathroom remains exactly as it was when it was:

   • approved by Building Control,

   • accepted by HMO officers, and

   • formally licensed by the Council in 2020.
     No new legislation, no new hazard, and no new evidence has emerged that could justify a reversal of that approved position.

4. As demonstrated, the bathroom complies fully with all applicable legislation, amenity standards and national guidance, and has done so for many years. The officer’s current objections are purely subjective opinion, which cannot form the basis of a licensing condition and are expressly rejected by the legitimate expectation principles established in Coughlan.

5. Most importantly, the condition is incapable of lawful enforcement in any event.
   A 7-bed HMO requires two bathrooms, one per five occupants.
   This property has three fully operational bathrooms.
   Therefore, even if the first-floor bathroom were hypothetically not in use at all, the statutory amenity requirements would remain fully satisfied. A condition purporting to redesign a bathroom that is not legally required for compliance is inherently redundant and unenforceable.

6. The attempt to impose this condition appears to be an effort to achieve through licensing what cannot be enforced through any statutory route. As established by Hanif, Mohamed, Boddington and the FTT lock-removal cases, an authority cannot use licence conditions to manufacture obligations that do not exist in law.
   A condition that is ultra vires from the outset carries no legal effect, cannot found an offence, and cannot justify enforcement action.

7. The Council’s position is further undermined by its inconsistency: the same bathroom in the same configuration was repeatedly inspected and accepted under identical legal standards. Reversing that approval under unchanged law is procedurally unfair and unlawful.

For all these reasons, and based on the comprehensive grounds already set before the Tribunal, the Applicant respectfully submits that the proposed bathroom condition is:

• contrary to the Housing Act 2004,

• contradictory to national standards,

• unsupported by evidence,

• irrational,

• ultra vires, and

• incapable of lawful enforcement.

The only legally sound outcome is therefore to strike out the condition in full, and to confirm the licence on the same terms and basis as the 2020 licence, for which all statutory requirements were—and continue to be—fully met.

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2. Statutory Limits on Licence Conditions

Sections 64(3)(a) and 67(1)(b) of the Housing Act 2004 restrict licence conditions to those “necessary or appropriate” for
(a) regulating the management of the HMO, or
(b) ensuring the property is reasonably suitable for occupation.

A requirement to redesign, remove, or reconfigure long-established, lawful amenities — or to satisfy design preferences not found in any legislation — exceeds those powers.

Authority: R (Peat) v South Hams DC [2008] EWHC 1076 (Admin) – licensing powers cannot compel arbitrary, aesthetic, or subjective alterations.

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3. Long-Standing, Lawful, and Previously Licensed Configuration

• The first-floor bathroom has existed in essentially the same configuration for over 25 years.

• The Council accepted and licensed this configuration formally in 2020.

• There has been no change in national legislation or standards regarding sanitary layout since 2019–2020.

Therefore, the legal framework now is identical to the framework under which the bathroom was previously approved.

A reversal of position without legal change violates the principle of legitimate expectation.

Authority: R v North & East Devon HA ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213.

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4. 2018–2020 Inspection & Building-Control History

Council and Building Control records confirm:

• 2018 – Building Control inspected during loft conversion; no issue raised.

• 2018–2019 – Former HMO officer Mark Sherwood inspected the bathroom several times; no concerns raised.

• 2020 – Bathroom included in the approved HMO licence plans with no objections.

These are official acts of the Council.
The Council cannot now contradict its own prior approvals based solely on a new officer’s opinion.

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5. Absence of Legislative Authority & Council Non-Response

Despite repeated formal requests (Nov 2024, May/June 2025), the Council has never identified any legislation authorising the proposed redesign or removal.

This sustained failure to cite legal authority:

• confirms the demand is based solely on subjective judgment, and

• constitutes a breach of procedural fairness.

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6. Council’s Own Statements Demonstrate the Issue

In 2024 the Council wrote:

“We do not consider the space and layout of the first-floor shower room to be adequate … A practical solution would be to remove either the shower cubicle or the WC…”

Our response correctly identified that:

• “We do not consider” = an opinion, not law;

• Hundreds of users have safely used this bathroom for 15+ years;

• Earlier officers and Building Control formally accepted the layout;

• No statutory minimum space requirements exist in UK law;

• Even recommendations do not include “standing space” rules;

• The bathroom is fully usable and comfortable.

There is no hazard, no evidence, no legislative breach.

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7. Engineer’s Report & Witness Evidence

If required, the Applicant will supply:

• an independent engineer’s confirmation that the bathroom is safe, ventilated, structurally sound, and fully compliant, and

• multiple witnesses (tenants and professionals) confirming decades of safe and comfortable use.

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8. Oversupply of Facilities & Risk Created by the Condition

The property has three full bathrooms for seven occupants — exceeding national HMO amenity standards.

Removing an amenity would:

• reduce sanitary capacity,

• increase risk of non-compliance if another bathroom requires repair,

• diminish tenant welfare, and

• contradict the statutory objective of maintaining adequate facilities.

Thus, the condition is counterproductive and contrary to public interest.

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9. Dangerous Precedent & Public-Interest Implications

If this condition were upheld:

1. An unchanged property under unchanged law could be penalised solely due to different officer opinions.

2. Council discretion would replace objective law.

3. Landlords would lose lawful amenities because of internal subjective interpretations.

4. Housing stock would be degraded rather than improved.

This undermines consistency, predictability, and public trust in HMO licensing.

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10. No Identified HHSRS Hazard or Improvement Notice

For obvious reasons, no Category 1 or 2 hazard exists.
Under the HHSRS Regulations 2005, works can be required only where a hazard is formally identified.

No hazard notice = no lawful basis for works.

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11. Building Regulations & Retrospective Enforcement

The Building Regulations 2010 apply to new or materially altered works — not to lawful installations over 25 years old.

Retrospective enforcement is barred by:

• Building Act 1984, s.35, and

• Lambeth LBC v Secretary of State [1981] 1 WLR 1529.

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12. Disproportionate Interference With Property Rights

The condition violates Article 1, Protocol 1 (A1P1), incorporated via the Human Rights Act 1998, because it:

• imposes unnecessary and expensive alterations,

• reduces amenities,

• provides no legitimate public benefit, and

• interferes with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.

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13. Legal Grounds, Case Law, and Their Application